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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a fiscal theory of sovereign risk and default. Under certain monetary-
fiscal regimes, the risk of default, and thus the emergence of sovereign risk premia, are inevitable.
The paper characterizes the equilibrium processes of the sovereign risk premium and the default rate
under a number of alternative monetary policy arrangements. Under some of the policy
environments considered, the expected default rate and the sovereign risk premium are zero although
the government defaults regularly.  Under other monetary regimes the default rate and the sovereign
risk premium are serially correlated and therefore forecastable. Environments are characterized








Certain monetary-ﬁscal arrangements are incompatible withprice stability and government
solvency. Consider, for example, the case of an independent central bank whose policy is to
peg the price level. Under this monetary regime, the government cannot use the price level
as a shock absorber of negative ﬁscal shocks. Speciﬁcally, by sticking to a price level target,
the government gives up its ability to inﬂate away part of the real value of public debt via
surprise inﬂation in response to a sudden deterioration of the ﬁscal budget. Under these
circumstances, default of the public debt is inevitable.1
Policy regimes of this type, under which debt repudiation is, under certain states of the
world the only possible outcome, are not unheard of. A point in case is the recent debt
crisis in Argentina. Between 1991 and early 2002, Argentina pegged the domestic price of
tradables to the US counterpart by ﬁxing the peso/dollar exchange rate. Abandoning the
exchange-rate peg was never an easy option for the Argentine government. This is because
the peg was instituted by a law of Congress—the 1991 Convertibility Law—which required
the enactment of another law to deactivate it. In the midst of a prolonged recession, in 2001
doubts began to be cast about the government’s ability to curb ﬁscal imbalances. These
fears placed the country risk premium, measured by the diﬀerence between the interest rate
on Argentine and US dollar-denominated government bonds of similar maturities, over 1,800
basis points, among the world’s highest at the time. Eventually, the Argentine government
defaulted; ﬁrst on interest obligations, in December of 2001, and shortly thereafter on the
entire principal.
Price level targeting is not the only monetary arrangement under which pressures for
default can arise under certain ﬁscal scenarios. Consider, for example, the case of a central
bank that aggressively pursues an inﬂation target by setting the nominal interest rate as
an increasing function of inﬂation with a reaction coeﬃcient larger than unity. This type
of policy rule is often referred to as a Taylor rule after John Taylor’s (1993) seminal paper.
Suppose that, at the same time, the ﬁscal authority follows an active stance whereby it does
not adjust the primary deﬁcit to ensure intertemporal solvency. Under this policy mix, if
the government refrains from defaulting, then price stability is in general unattainable. In
particular, the equilibrium rate of inﬂation converges to either plus or minus inﬁnity. Loyo
(1999) refers to the latter equilibrium as a ‘ﬁscalist hyperinﬂation.’ Given this monetary-
ﬁscal regime, default is a necessary consequence if price stability is to be preserved. An
example of the policy regime described here is given by Brazil. After abandoning a crawling
1Krugman’s (1979) celebrated model of balance of payments crises is an example in which the aforemen-
tioned incompatibility is resolved by abandoning the price stability goal.
1peg policy, since mid 1999 the Brazilian central bank has actively used the interest rate as an
instrument to target inﬂation. Although in recent years ﬁscal discipline has been enhanced,
the Brazilian Treasury is facing serious diﬃculties implementing additional ﬁscal reforms
necessary to slowdown the rapid growth in public debt. Interestingly, a growing number of
observers are beginning to consider a ’unilateral restructuring’ of Brazil’s public debt as a
likely way out of hyperinﬂation.2
The focus of this paper is to characterize the equilibrium behavior of default and the
country risk premium in policy environments under which the government cannot guarantee
the full service of public obligations without relinquishing price stability. A central ques-
tion this paper seeks to answer is how diﬀerent monetary policy speciﬁcations aﬀect the
equilibrium behavior of default and sovereign risk premia. The analysis is organized around
two canonical policy arrangements. Under bothenvironments ﬁscal policy is assumed to be
‘active’ in the sense of Leeper (1991). Speciﬁcally, real primary surpluses are assumed to be
exogenous and random. In one of the policy regimes considered, the central bank pegs the
price level. In the other, the monetary authority follows a Taylor rule.
Our characterization of equilibrium under default reveals that the properties of the equi-
librium stochastic process followed by the default rate and the sovereign risk premium depend
heavily upon the underlying monetary policy regime. For example, in the Taylor-rule econ-
omy, the expected default rate and the country risk premium are zero. This means that the
default rate is unforecastable. By contrast, in the price-targeting economy current and past
ﬁscal deﬁcits predict future default rates. Moreover, in the price-targeting economy the ﬁs-
cal authority has more degrees of freedom in setting the default rate than in the Taylor-rule
economy.
Clearly, having to default is a situation no policymaker wishes to be involved in. So
procrastination is commonplace. Sometimes governments choose to let go of their price
stability goals in the hopes of retaking them after inﬂating their way out of default. A
natural question, therefore, is what standard general equilibrium models tell us about the
consequences of delaying default. We ﬁnd that substituting a temporary increase in inﬂation
for default is not always possible. Speciﬁcally, we identify situations in which postponing the
decision to default leads to a hyperinﬂationary situation that in order to be stopped requires
an eventual default of larger dimension than the one that would have taken place had the
government not chosen to procrastinate.
2See, for example, the articles by Ted Truman (senior fellowat the Institute for International Economics,
former assistant secretary of the Treasury for international aﬀairs, and former director of the Division of
International Finance at the Federal Reserve Board) published in the Financial Times on June 25, 2002, and
by Joaqu´ ın Cottani (chief economist of Lehman Brothers) published in the Argentine newspaper La Naci´ on
on June 23, 2002. See also the June 29, 2002 issue of The Economist.
2We close this introduction by pointing out two assumptions that will be maintained
throughout the paper. First, the analysis departs from a large existing literature on sovereign
debt in that here, given the monetary and ﬁscal regimes, the government is assumed to
always choose to honor its ﬁnancial obligations if it can.3 Second, we assume that public
debt is nonindexed. In practice this is not the case. Typically, emerging market debt is
denominated in foreign currency or stipulates returns tied to some domestic price index.
Introducing indexation does not aﬀect the qualitative results of the paper. But it does
introduce quantitative diﬀerences. This is because the more pervasive indexation is, the
larger are the price level changes necessary to obtain a given decline in government’s total
liabilities.4
The remainder of the paper is organized in six sections. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 derives a basic equilibrium relation linking the default rate, future expected ﬁscal
surpluses, and initial government liabilities. Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium behavior
of default and sovereign risk when monetary policy takes the form of a Taylor rule. Section 5
analyzes the consequences of delaying default. Section 6 studies default and country risk
under a price-level peg. Section 7 closes the paper.
2 The Model
Consider an economy populated by a large number of identical households, each of which






where ct denotes consumption of a perishable good, β ∈ (0,1) denotes the subjective discount
factor, and E0 denotes the mathematical expectation operator conditional on information
available in period 0. The single-period utility function U is assumed to be increasing, strictly
concave, and twice continuously diﬀerentiable.
In eachperiod t ≥ 0, households can purchase nominal state-contingent claims that pay
one unit of currency in a speciﬁed state of period t +1 . W el e tDt+1 denote the random
variable indicating the number of state-contingent claims purchased in period t paying oﬀ in
eachparticular state of period t + 1. In addition, each period households are endowed with
3For a survey of the literature on sovereign debt in settings where governments that are not forced to
default by ﬁscal constraints nevertheless always choose to do so if they ﬁnd it optimal, see Eaton and
Fern´ andez (1995).
4Even if the totality of public debt was indexed, changes in the price level would still introduce ﬁscal
eﬀects in the presence of ﬁat money. In this paper we do away with money for analytical simplicity.
3an exogenous and constant amount of perishable goods y and pay real lump-sum taxes in
the amount τt. The ﬂow budget constraint of the household in period t is then given by:
Ptct + Etrt+1Dt+1 + Ptτt ≤ Dt + Pty, (2)
where Pt denotes the price level, and rt+1 denotes the period-t price of a claim to one unit
of currency in a particular state of period t + 1 divided by the probability of occurrence of
that state conditional on information available in period t. The left-hand side of the budget
constraint represents the uses of wealth: consumption spending, purchases of contingent
claims, and tax payments. The right-hand side displays the sources of wealth: the payoﬀ
of contingent claims acquired in the previous period and the endowment. In addition, the




Etqt+jDt+j ≥ 0, (3)
at all dates and under all contingencies. The variable qt represents the period-zero price of
one unit of currency to be delivered in a particular state of period t divided by the probability
of occurrence of that state given information available at time 0 and is given by
qt = r1r2 ...r t,
with q0 ≡ 1.
The household chooses the set of processes {ct,D t+1}∞
t=0, so as to maximize (1) subject to
(2) and (3), taking as given the set of processes {Pt,r t+1,τ t}∞
t=0 and the initial condition D0.
Let the multiplier on the ﬂow budget constraint be λt/Pt. Then the ﬁrst-order conditions









The interpretation of these optimality conditions is straightforward. Condition (4) states
that the marginal utility of consumption must equal the marginal utility of wealth, λt,a t
all times. Equation (5) represents a standard pricing equation for one-step-ahead nominal
4contingent claims. Note that Etrt+1 is the period-t price of an asset that pays one unit of
currency in every state of period t +1 . T hu sEtrt+1 represents the inverse of the risk-free
gross nominal interest rate. Formally, letting R
f








2.1 The Fiscal Authority
The government levies lump-sum taxes, τt, which are assumed to follow an exogenous, sta-
tionary, stochastic process. For simplicity, we assume that τt follows an AR(1) process:
τt − ¯ τ = ρ(τt−1 − ¯ τ)+ t, (7)
where ¯ τ is the unconditional mathematical expectation of taxes, the parameter ρ ∈ [0,1)
denotes the serial correlation of taxes, and  t ∼ N(0,σ 2
 ) is an iid random tax innovation. In
period t, the government nominal bonds, denoted by Bt, that pay a gross nominal interest
rate Rt in period t + 1. The interest rate Rt is known in period t. Government bonds are
risky assets. For each period the ﬁscal authority may default on a fraction δt of its total
liabilities. A focal point of our analysis is the characterization of the equilibrium distribution
of the default rate δt. The government’s sequential budget constraint is then given by
Bt = Rt−1Bt−1(1 − δt) − τtPt; t ≥ 0.
2.2 Equilibrium
In equilibrium the goods market must clear. That is,
ct = y.
The fact that in equilibrium consumption is constant over time implies, by equation (4),
that the marginal utility of wealth λt is also constant. In turn, the constancy of λt implies,





5This expression and equation (6) then imply that in equilibrium the nominally risk free
interest rate R
f











Because all households are assumed to be identical, in equilibrium there is no borrowing or
lending among them. Thus, all interest-bearing asset holdings by private agents are in the
form of government securities. That is,
Dt = Rt−1Bt−1(1 − δt),
at all dates.
Optimizing households must be indiﬀerent between holding government bonds and state
contingent bonds. This means that the following Euler equation must hold:




We are now ready to deﬁne an equilibrium.

























along with a deﬁnition of monetary policy and further restrictions on ﬁscal policy, given
R−1B−1 and the exogenous process for lump-sum taxes {τt}∞
t=0.
63 The Equilibrium Default Rate
We now derive a key implication of the model for the relation between the equilibrium default
rate, expected future ﬁscal deﬁcits, and initial public debt. Multiplying the left- and right-













































Apply the conditional expectations operator Et on both sides of this expression, use the













Now multiply bothsides of th is equation by βj, take the limit for j →∞ , and use equilibrium









If one sets the default rate to zero, this expression collapses to the central equation of the
ﬁscal theory of price level determination (Cochrane, 1998; Sims, 1994; Woodford, 1994). In
that literature, the above expression determines the equilibrium price level. In general, the
above equation contains two non-predetermined endogenous variables, δt and Pt.S o l v i n gf o r





; t ≥ 0. (13)
This expression, describing the law of motion of the equilibrium default rate, is quite intu-
itive. It states that the default rate is zero—that is, the government honors its outstanding
obligations in the full extent—when the present discounted value of primary surpluses is
expected to be equal to the real value of total initial government liabilities. In this case, the
government does not need to repudiate its commitments because it is able to raise enough
surpluses in the future to pay the interest on its existing real obligations. The government de-
faults on its debt whenever the present discounted value of primary ﬁscal surpluses falls short
of total real initial liabilities. The extent of the default—i.e., how close δt is to one—depends
on the gap between real government liabilities and the present value of future expected tax
receipts. Note that in computing the present discounted value of ﬁscal surpluses the real
risk-free interest rate is applied, which in equilibrium coincides with the inverse of the sub-
jective rate of discount, 1/β. Using the AR(1) process assumed for τt (equation (7)), the
above expression becomes
δt =1−
(1 − β)(τt − ¯ τ)+( 1− βρ)¯ τ
Rt−1Bt−1/Pt(1 − β)(1 − βρ)
; t ≥ 0. (14)
Intuitively, this expression shows that given the level of initial real government liabilities,
Rt−1Bt−1/Pt,t hem o r ep e r s i s t e n ti st het a xp r o c e s s — i . e . ,t hel a r g e ri s ρ—the larger is the
default on public debt triggered by a given decline in current tax revenues.
4 Taylor Rules and Default
In the past two decades, monetary policy in industrialized countries has taken the form of an
interest-rate feedback rule whereby the short term nominal interest rate is set as a function
of inﬂation and the output gap (Taylor, 1993; and Clarida et al., 1998). Moreover, estimates
of this feedback rule feature a slope with respect to inﬂation that is signiﬁcantly above unity,
typically around 1.5. More recently, a number of developing countries, notably Brazil, have
adopted similar active interest-rate rules withth e objective of targeting inﬂation. To capture











We assume that monetary policy is active, that is, that αβ > 1.
4.1 Impossibility of Achieving the Inﬂation Target Without De-
faulting
Can the government ensure an inﬂation path equal to the target π∗ without ever resorting
to default? The answer to this question is no. To see why, suppose that the government sets
δt =0 ; t ≥ 0. (16)
The complete set of equilibrium conditions is then given by (15), (16), and the equations





The numerator on the right-hand side of this expression is predetermined in period 0. The
denominator, on the other hand, is determined in period 0, but is exogenously given. This
means that in general P0 will be diﬀerent from P−1π∗, or, equivalently, that the equilibrium
inﬂation rate in period zero will in general be oﬀ target. Furthermore, the monetary authority
will miss the inﬂation target not only in period zero but at every subsequent date. In
particular, the equilibrium features either hyperinﬂation or hyperdeﬂation. To see why,
assume for simplicity that taxes are non-stochastic and consider perfect-foresight equilibria.
Let πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 denote the gross inﬂation rate in period t. Then combining equations (10)
and (15) we obtain the following diﬀerence equation in πt:
πt+1 = αβπt +( 1− αβ)π
∗.
In deriving this expression we set R∗ = π∗/β, to ensure that the inﬂation target π∗ is a
steady-state solution to the above diﬀerence equation. It follows by the fact that αβ > 1,
that if π0 >π ∗ then πt →∞ . In this case, the economy embarks in a hyperinﬂation.
Loyo (1999) refers to this equilibrium as a ‘ﬁscalist hyperinﬂation,’ and argues that the
5Note that we do not include a term depending on the output gap because in the endowment economy
considered here the output gap is nil at all times.
9monetary/ﬁscal regime that gives rise to these dynamics was in place in Brazil during the
high inﬂation episode of the early 1980s.
On the other hand, if π0 <π ∗,t he n πt →− ∞ , and the economy falls into a hyperde-
ﬂation. Of course, the inﬂation rate cannot converge to minus inﬁnity because in that case,
according to the linear monetary policy rule (15), the nominal interest rate would reach a
negative value in ﬁnite time, which is impossible. It follows from the work of Schmitt-Groh´ e
and Uribe (2000) and Benhabib, Schmitt-Groh´ e, and Uribe (2001,2002) that the zero bound
on the nominal interest rate implies that when π0 <π ∗, the economy converges to a ‘liquidity
trap,’ characterized by low and possibly negative inﬂation and low and possibly zero nominal
interest rates.
4.2 Unforecastability of the Default Rate
It follows from the preceeding analysis that if the government is to preserve price stability
(i.e., if it is to succeed in attaining the inﬂation target π∗), then it must default sometimes.
It turns out that if δt is allowed to be diﬀerent from zero, then the government can indeed




∗; t ≥ 0. (17)
This expression along with the Taylor rule (15) and the equations listed in deﬁnition 1
represent the complete set of equilibrium conditions. Equations (15) and (17) imply that
Rt = R∗ = π∗/β for all t ≥ 0. (We are again assuming that R∗ = π∗/β.) The Euler
equation (9) then implies that
Etδt+1 =0 ; t ≥ 0.
This means that the equilibrium default rate in eﬀect in period t + 1 is unforecastable in
period t. The exact equilibrium process followed by δt c a nb eo b t a i n e dw i t h t hehe l po f






The numerator on the right-hand side of this expression is exogenously given. At the same
time, the denominator is predetermined in period 0. So the above equation fully characterizes
the equilibrium default rate in period 0. The default rate is increasing in the initial level of
real government liabilities and decreasing in the expected present discounted value of future
10primary surpluses.
In periods t>0, equation (13) and the fact that Rt−1 = π∗/β imply that the default






; t ≥ 1. (19)
In this expression, Bt−1/Pt−1 is an endogenous variable, which we want to express in terms






(1 − δt−1) − τt−1; t ≥ 1.
Using equations (18) and (19) to eliminate
Rt−2Bt−2















hEt−1τt+h; t ≥ 1.
Finally, using this expression to eliminate Bt−1/Pt−1 from (19) we obtain the following ex-
pression for the equilibrium default rate:
δt =1−
 ∞
h=0 βhEtτt+h  ∞
h=0 βhEt−1τt+h
; t ≥ 1.
This equation states that in any period t>0, the government defaults when the present
discounted value of primary ﬁscal surpluses is below the value expected for this variable in
period t − 1. That is, the government defaults in response to unanticipated deteriorations
in expected future tax receipts. Note that the fact that δt has mean zero implies that
sometimes—when δt < 0—the government subsidizes bond holders.6 One might think that
6 The result that the default rate has mean zero depends in part on our maintained assumption that
R∗ = π∗/β. If one assumes that R∗ >π ∗/β, then an equilibrium in which the inﬂation rate is always equal
to the target (πt = π∗) still exists. In this case, the Taylor rule (15) implies that the equilibrium interest
rate is constant and equal to R∗. In turn, the Euler equation (10) implies that the conditional expectation
of the default rate in period t+1> 0 given information available in t is given by Etδt+1 =1−βR∗/π∗ > 0.
It is easy to showthat the equilibrium default rate in period 0 is still given by equation (18), w hile the






h=0 βhEt−1τt+h; t ≥ 1. Note that, ceteris paribus,
the default rate is decreasing in the inﬂation target π∗ and increasing in the interest rate target R∗.T h e
intuition behind this result is straightforward. The ratio R∗/π∗ denotes the real interest rate promised by
11a more realistic model would feature a nonnegativity constraint on the default rate. The
appendix to this paper analyzes ways to implement this restriction.
Because in this economy the inﬂation rate is constant over time, the Euler equation (9)
implies that the risk-free nominal interest rate is constant and given by R
f
t = π∗β−1.B u tt hi s
is precisely the equilibrium value taken by the interest rate on government bonds. Therefore,
the gross sovereign risk premium, given by the ratio of the rate of return on public debt to
the risk-free rate, Rt/R
f
t , is constant and equal to unity.
5 The Perils of Delaying Default: Unpleasant Default
Arithmetics
Thus far, we have considered only two alternative default policies. One is characterized by no
default at any point in time and leads to (ﬁscalist) hyperinﬂation or hyperdeﬂation depending
on initial conditions. The second default policy ensures a path for prices consistent with the
government’s inﬂation target and features a stochastic, unforecastable default rate.
But there are indeed inﬁnitely many other possible default arrangements. Here we focus
on one that captures certain aspects of observed pre-default dynamics. Namely, in prac-
tice, governments that follow unsustainable policies tend to procrastinate. Only when the
economy is clearly embarked in an explosive path, such as a hyperinﬂation, do governments
dare to make hard decisions, such as defaulting. An example is the pre-default transition
in Argentina in the second half of 2001. A number of observers believed at the time that
under the policy arrangement prevailing at the end of the De la Rua-Cavallo administration,
described as a rigid peg to the dollar coupled with a precarious ﬁscal stance, default was
simply a matter of time.7 At the end, this sentiments materialized and the Argentine gov-
ernment repudiated its outstanding ﬁnancial obligations. First partially, via a debt swap in
December of 2001, and shortly afterward, in January of 2002, totally. The painful economic
depression and price stampid that followed the default led many to wonder whether the
Argentine government had waited too long to default. When the policy mix is incompatible
withlong-run price stability, delaying default may prove counterproductive for two reasons.
First, the longer the government waits to default, the higher is the inﬂation rate the econ-
omy is exposed to. Second, the longer the delay, the higher the default rate required to
stabilize prices. This is the sense in which we introduce the concept of ‘unpleasant default
arithmetics.’ To illustrate this point, consider a perfect-foresight environment and suppose
the government. The higher is this interest rate, the higher is the cost of serving the debt without defaulting.
7See, for example, the commentaries on Argentina published in The Economist on October 20-26, 2001,
and The Washington Post, on October 22, 2001.
12that the government decides to delay default for T>0 periods. That is, the ﬁscal authority
sets
δt =0 ; 0≤ t<T . (20)
In period T, the government ﬁnally decides to default in a magnitude suﬃcient to ensure





∗; t ≥ T. (21)
In this case, a rational expectations equilibrium is given by deﬁnition 1 and equations (15),
(20), and (21). Because the default rate is zero before period T, the Euler equation (10)
implies that
Rt = β
−1πt+1; t ≤ T − 2. (22)
Combining this expression with the Taylor rule (15) we get πt+1 = π∗ + αβ(πt − π∗)f o r
0 ≤ t ≤ T −2, where we are assuming that R∗ ≡ π∗/β. This expression implies the following




∗); 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1. (23)
In turn, assuming that τt = τ for all t,w he r e τ is a constant, equations (13) and (20) imply
that the initial inﬂation rate is exogenously given by π0 = R−1B−1(1 − β)/(P−1τ). We are
interested in the case
π0 >π
∗.
This assumption and equation (23) show that the longer the government waits to default,
the higher the inﬂation rate the public must endure.
In period T −1, the Taylor rule (15) states that βRT−1 = π∗+αβ(πT−1−π∗). Combining





Finally, in period T the stabilization policy kicks in, so πT = π∗. The Euler equation (10)
evaluated at t = T − 1 then implies that δT =1− π∗/(βRT−1). Combining this expression
13with equation (24) yields the following solution for the default rate in period T:
δT =1−
π∗
π∗ +( αβ)T(π0 − π∗)
.
This expression shows that the longer the government procrastinates the larger the rate of
default necessary to bring about price stability. In the limit, as T →∞ , the government is
forced to default on the entire stock of public debt. Note that the government defaults only
once, in period T.I np e r i o d st ≥ T, the Taylor rule (15) implies that Rt = π∗/β,s ot ha t ,b y
the Euler equation (10), δt = 0. Summarizing, we have that if the government delays default








The intuition why a government that procrastinates for too long ends up defaulting on its
entire obligations is simple. If the government puts oﬀ default for a suﬃciently long period
of time, the inﬂation rate in period T − 1 climbs to a level far above its intended target π∗.
As a result, the Taylor rule prescribes a very high nominal interest rate in that period. In
period T, the inﬂation rate drops sharply to its target π∗. This means that the ‘promised’
(i.e., before default) real interest rate on government assets held between periods T −1a n d
T,g i v e nb yRT−1/π∗, experiences a drastic hike, generating a severe solvency problem, which
the government resolves by defaulting.
Surprisingly, in this economy the stock of real public debt provides no indication of
worsening fundamentals as the economy approaches the default crisis. In eﬀect, the stock of
public real debt, bt ≡ Bt/Pt, remains constant along the entire transition. To see this, note
that the government’s budget constraint implies that b0 = R−1b−1/π0 − τ.U s i n g t he f a c t
that π0 = R−1B−1(1 − β)/(P−1τ), we obtain
b0 = βτ/(1 − β).
A tt hes a m et i m e ,i np e r i o d s0 <t≤ T −1w eha v et ha t bt = Rt−1bt−1/πt −τ = bt−1/β −τ.
(In the second equality we are using the fact that δt =0f o rt<T , so that the Euler
equation (10) implies Rt = πt+1/β.) Then, assuming that bt−1 = βτ/(1 − β), we have that
14bt =
βτ




;0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1.
Note that the fact that the default rate is zero between periods 0 and T − 1 implies that
the interest-rate premium on public debt is zero between periods 0 and T − 2. In period
T −1 the premium jumps up to (1−δT)−1 −1. Finally, in period T the premium returns to
zero and remains at that level forever. However, in a model were the date T at which the
government decides to ‘pull the plug’ is random, the interest rare premium will in general
be positive for all 0 <t<T.
6P r i c e L e v e l T a r g e t i n g
We now turn our attention to another example of a monetary regime that, if not coupled
withsome sort of (intertemporal) balanced budget rule, can make default inevitable. Namely,
price level pegs.8 By pegging the price level, the government gives up its ability to inﬂate
away part of the real value of its liabilities in response to negative ﬁscal shocks. It is therefore
clear that short of endogenous regular ﬁscal instruments able to oﬀset such exogenous ﬁscal
innovations, default emerges as a necessary outcome. As in the previous section, we are
interested in consisting the equilibrium process of the default rate under these circumstances.
It turns out that given the ﬁscal regime, the equilibrium default rate behaves quite diﬀerently
under a price level peg than under a Taylor rule.
Formally, the monetary regime we wish to study in this section is given by:
Pt =1 ; t ≥ 0. (25)
The equilibrium conditions then include this rule and the equations contained in deﬁnition 1.
Note that the constancy of the price level implies, by equation (9), that the risk-free interest





Using the facts that Pt and R
f
t are bothconstant at all times, we can rewrite th e deﬁnition
f equilibrium more compactly as:
8In open economies where PPP holds, governments interested in pegging the price level typically resort
to pegging the exchange rate between the domestic currency and that of a low-inﬂation country. Recent
examples include Argentina, Austria, and Hong-Kong.
15Deﬁnition 2 (Rational Expectations Equilibrium Under Price Level Targeting) A
rational expectations competitive equilibrium is a set of processes {Bt,R t,δ t}∞
t=0 satisfying
1=βRtEt(1 − δt+1) (27)




t+j+1Rt+jBt+j(1 − δt+j+1)=0 .
and a ﬁscal-policy constraint further restricting the behavior of the default rate, given R−1B−1
and the exogenous process for lump-sum taxes {τt}∞
t=0.
6.1 The Equilibrium Stock of Public Debt







Note that because the price level is constant and normalized at one, the denominator on the
right-hand side, Rt−1Bt−1, represents bothnominal and real total government liabilities. It
will prove convenient to write the above expression using the speciﬁc AR(1) process assumed
for taxes. This yields
δt =1−
(1 − β)(τt − ¯ τ)+( 1− βρ)¯ τ
Rt−1Bt−1(1 − β)(1 − βρ)
. (30)
To obtain the equilibrium level of public debt, evaluate equation (27) at time t +1a n d
take expectations conditional on information available at time t. Then use equation (29) to






According to this expression, the government’s ability to absorb debt is dictated by the
expected value of future tax receipts. Note that the level of debt is independent of the mag-
nitude of liabilities assumed by the government in the past, Rt−1Bt−1. Under the assumed
16ﬁrst-order autorregressive structure of taxes, the above expression becomes
Bt =
βρ(1 − β)(τt − ¯ τ)+β(1 − βρ)¯ τ
(1 − β)(1 − βρ)
. (32)
By this formula, a given decline in current tax revenues obliges the government to engineer
a larger cut in public debt the more persistent is the tax process.
6.2 Impossibility of Pegging the Price Level Without Defaulting
Evaluating equation (29), which describes the law of motion of the equilibrium default rate,






In period 0, the government cannot aﬀect any of the variables entering the right-hand side
of this expression. In eﬀect, taxes are assumed to be exogenous, and initial total public
liabilities are pre-determined. Consequently, the government has no control over the initial
rate of default δ0. A negative initial tax shock leads inevitably to default. It follows that it
is impossible to ﬁx δ0 equal to zero.
A natural question is whether the government has the ability to arbitrarily ﬁx the level of
the default rate (at zero, say) in all periods following period 0. The answer to this question
is no. To see why, assume, contrary to our contention, that the government is capable of
setting δt at a constant level ¯ δ for all t>0. Then, evaluating (30) at t +1w eha v et ha t Rt
is implicitly given by
¯ δ =1−
(1 − β)(τt+1 − ¯ τ)+( 1− βρ)¯ τ
RtBt(1 − β)(1 − βρ)
On the right-hand side, τt+1 is measurable withrespect to th e information set available in
period t +1a n dBt is measurable withrespect to information available in t. It follows that
according to the above expression, Rt is measurable withrespect to information available
in t + 1, which is a contradiction, because, by assumption, the government announces Rt in
period t. It follows that the government cannot ﬁx the rate of default for all t>0.
Although the government is unable to perfectly control the dynamics of the default rate,
it can aﬀect it on a limited basis. This is the focus of what follows.
176.3 Default Rule 1
Consider, for example, a policy rule whereby in each period t>0 the government does not
default unless the tax-to-debt ratio falls below a certain threshold. Speciﬁcally, suppose that
the government restricts δt in the following way:




< 0i f τt/Bt−1 >α
=0 i fτt/Bt−1 = α
> 0i f τt/Bt−1 <α
t =1 ,2,···, (33)
where the threshold α is chosen arbitrarily by the ﬁscal authority. In this case, a rational
expectations equilibrium is given by this expression and deﬁnition 2. According to the above
rule, the government defaults on part of the public debt when the tax-to-debt ratio τ/Bt−1
is below the announced threshold α. This situation takes place in periods of relatively low
tax realizations. On the other hand, when the tax-to-debt ratio exceeds the threshold α,t he
government chooses to reward bond holders by implementing a subsidy proportional to the
size of their portfolios.
The default rule (33) can be implemented by an appropriate choice of the interest rate
promised on public debt, Rt. To see this, consider any period t>0i nw hi c h τt = αBt−1.I n
suchperiods, th e equilibrium condition (28) becomes
Bt = Rt−1Bt−1 − αBt−1.
Using equation (32) to eliminate Bt we obtain
βρ(1 − β)(αBt−1 − ¯ τ)+β(1 − βρ)¯ τ
(1 − β)(1 − βρ)
= Rt−1Bt−1 − αBt−1.
Solving this expression for the interest rate, yields
Rt = α +
βρ(1 − β)(αBt − ¯ τ)+β(1 − βρ)¯ τ
Bt(1 − β)(1 − βρ)
; t =0 ,1,...
This expression and equation (32), which expresses Bt as a function of τt only, jointly describe
the equilibrium law of motion of the interest rate as a function of current taxes. Combining
the above expression with equation (30) to eliminate Rt, we ﬁnd that the equilibrium default
rate in periods t>0i sg i v e nb y
δt =1−
(1 − β)(τt − ¯ τ)+( 1− βρ)¯ τ
α(1 − β)(1 − βρ)Bt−1 + βρ(1 − β)(αBt−1 − ¯ τ)+β(1 − βρ)¯ τ
.
18Figure 1: Equilibrium Dynamics Under Default Rule 1




































Figure 1 illustrates how the model economy operates under default rule 1. It depicts the
equilibrium dynamics of taxes, public debt, the interest rate, and the default rate in response
to a negative tax innovation. The model is parameterized as follows. The time period is
meant to be one quarter. The subjective discount factor β is set equal to 1/(1 + .06/4),
which implies an annual real (and nominal) interest rate of 6 percent. Quarterly output, y,
is normalized at unity. The initial level of government liabilities, R−1B−1, is set at 4, implying
a debt-to-annual-GDP ratio of one. The average tax rate, ¯ τ is set at (1−β)R−1B−1,s ot ha t
if the tax rate in period zero equals its unconditional expectation ¯ τ, then the equilibrium
default rate in that period is zero. The serial correlation of taxes, ρ, is assumed to be 0.9.
Finally, we set the threshold α equal to (1 − β)/β. This value implies that the government
chooses to default whenever the tax-to-debt ratio is below its long-run level (1 − β)/β.
The initial situation depicted in the ﬁgure is one in which taxes are equal to their long-run
level ¯ τ. In period 5, the economy experiences a negative tax surprise. Speciﬁcally, in that
period taxes fall 20 percent below average; that is,  5 = −0.2¯ τ,o rτ5 =0 .8¯ τ. Tax innovations
after period 5 are nil (i.e.,  t =0f o rt>5). Note that the fact that the realizations of the
tax innovation are zero in periods other than period ﬁve (( t =0f o rt  = 5) does not mean
that the economy operates under certainty for t  = 5. This is because in any period t ≥ 0
agents are uncertain about future realizations of  . Between periods 0 and 4, the tax-to-debt
19ratio is at its long-run level. As a result, the government honors its obligations in full (δt =0
for t ≤ 4). In period 5, in response to the 20 percent decline in tax revenue, the government
defaults on about 2.5 percent of the public debt. Because the tax-to-debt ratio remains
below its long-run level along the entire transition, the government continues to default after
period 5. The cumulative default, given by
 ∞
t=5 δt, is about 23 percent. Before period 5,
the interest rate on public debt equals the risk-free rate of 1.5 percent reﬂecting no default
expectations (Etδt+1 = 0). In period 5, the interest rate on government bonds jumps to 3.6
percent and then returns monotonically to its steady-state level of 1.5 percent. The fact that
the risk-free interest rate is constant (Eq. (26)) implies that the sovereign risk premium,
Rt/R
f
t , is proportional to Rt. Thus, a deterioration in ﬁscal conditions triggers a persistent
increase in sovereign risk.
6.4 Default Rule 2
As a second example, consider a default rule whereby the government defaults only if the
tax rate is below a certain fraction of output. Formally,




< 0i f τt >α y
=0 i fτt = αy
> 0i f τt <α y
t =1 ,2,···, (34)
where α is a parameter chosen by the government, and y is the constant endowment. The
full set of equilibrium conditions is then given by the above rule and the equations listed in






βρ(1 − β)(αy − ¯ τ)+β(1 − βρ)¯ τ
Bt(1 − β)(1 − βρ)
; t =0 ,1,...
Figure 2 displays the model’s dynamics under default rule 2. The parameterization of the
model is identical to that used under rule 1, except for α, which is now set equal to ¯ τ/y so as
to induce pre-shock dynamics identical to those depicted in ﬁgure 1. The experiment shown
in ﬁgure 2 is the same as the one implemented under rule 1. Namely, the tax innovation  t
is 0 for all t  = 5 and is equal to −0.20¯ τ in period 5, so that in that period tax revenues fall
by 20 percent. For comparison, ﬁgure 1 reproduces withbroken lines th e dynamics under
rule 1. The dynamics under both rules are qualitatively identical. The interest rate and
the default rate rise in period 5 and then converge monotonically to their respective steady
states. However, the convergence is somewhat faster under default rule 1. To see why this
20Figure 2: Equilibrium Dynamics Under Default Rule 2
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21is the case, note that in periods t>5 the tax-to-output ratio τt/y is relatively further below
its steady state level than the tax-to-debt ratio, τt/Bt−1. This is because the stock of public
debt adjusts down in response to the tax cut, whereas output remains constant.
6.5 Default Rule 3: An Interest Rate Peg
As a ﬁnal example, consider the case of a peg of the rate of return on public debt. Speciﬁcally,






According to this policy, the government completely eliminates the sovereign risk premium.
In this case the equilibrium is given by deﬁnition 2 and the above rule.
Contrary to what happens under rules 1 and 2, under the interest rate peg considered
here the equilibrium default rate is an iid random variable with mean zero. That is, the
default rate is completely unforecastable. To see this, combine the interest-rate rule (35)
withth e Euler equation (27) to get
Etδt+1 =0 .
Figure 3 depicts the model’s dynamics under the assumed interest rate peg. For comparison,
the ﬁgure also reproduces the dynamics implied by default rule 1. Under the interest rate
peg, the default rate jumps up in period 5, when the tax shock takes place, but immediately
returns to zero. Note that because the magnitude of the jump in the default rate in period
5 is about the same under both rules and because the default rate is serially uncorrelated
under rule 3 but persistent under rule 1, the cumulative default is much higher under rule
1. How can this be possible if the initial level of public debt as well as the path of taxes are
the same in both economies? The reason is that under rule 3 the interest rate is lower than
under rule 1, which makes the post-shock debt burden including interest also smaller under
rule 3.
7C o n c l u s i o n
A number of emerging economies have or are facing the need to default. These countries
display heterogeneous policy arrangements. A central aim of this paper is to characterize the
precise way in which monetary policy aﬀects the equilibrium behavior of default and sovereign
22Figure 3: Equilibrium Dynamics Under Default Rule 3
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23risk premia. We ﬁnd that monetary policy indeed plays a signiﬁcant role in shaping the
equilibrium distribution of default and risk premia. For example, in the economy analyzed
in section 4, where the government follows a Taylor-type interest rate feedback rule, price
stability requires that the government defaults only by surprise. As a result, the country risk
premium is nil at all times even though the ﬁscal authority reneges of its obligations from
time to time. On the other hand, in an economy where the central bank pegs the price level,
like the one studied in section 6, both default and the country risk premium can be highly
persistent. But the precise ﬁscal and monetary regime in place are not the only characteristics
of policy behavior that contribute to giving form to the dynamics of default. An equally
important role is played by the government’s attitude toward making tough decisions. Some
governments have a natural tendency to put oﬀ as much as possible unavoidable painful
measures. This paper shows that in the case of default, procrastination can have unintended
consequences. For instance, in the economy where the monetary authority follows a Taylor
rule, postponing default leads not only to an explosive inﬂation path, but also to an eventual
default that is larger than the one that would have taken place if the government had not
tried to gain time. It is in this sense that we speak of an unpleasant arithmetics in attempting
to substitute inﬂation for default.
24Appendix
Taylor Rules and Non-Negative Default Rates
Consider an economy whose equilibrium conditions are given by the equations listed in
deﬁnition 1 and equations (15) and (17). Suppose in addition, that the default rate is
constrained to be nonnegative, that is
δt ≥ 0; ∀t.
. Clearly, equations (18) and (19) that in periods when the expected present discounted
value of (regular) taxes exceeds the real value of government liabilities, the government must
transfer resources to the public. Since the government cannot implement this transfers via
negative values of δ, it must materialize them through regular transfers. We refer to this
type of transfers as extraordinary. Speciﬁcally, suppose that the government has the ability
to transfer in a lump-sum fashion the diﬀerence between the expected present discounted
value of primary surpluses and current real liabilities. Let total taxes, τt,b eg i v e nb yt he
sum of ordinary taxes, τo







Ordinary taxes follow an exogenous AR(1) process of the form
τ
o
t − ¯ τ
o = ρ(τ
o
t−1 − ¯ τ
o)+ t,
We conjecture that the government can implement the equilibrium deﬁned above with non-
negative default rates by following the following rule for extraordinary taxes:
τ
e













w he r et hef u n c t i o n s g0 and g are to be determined. Under our conjecture, the Taylor rule (15)
implies that the interest rate is constant and given by
Rt = R
∗,
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t ,g); j ≥ 1.
We include the second argument in the functions Hj, j ≥ 1, to emphasize their dependence







; t ≥ 1. (36)
(this last expression introduced in footnote 6) continue to be valid here because their deriva-
tion does not depend upon the assumed tax structure. Given the AR(1) process speciﬁed for









t−1+γ5,w he r e γi, i =1 ,2,3,4,5 are known parameters. Then, using this expressions and













; t ≥ 1.
Setting δt =0a n dτe
t = g(τo













; t ≥ 1.











0 + γ7 = E0
 ∞
h=0 βhτ9
h and γ6 and γ7 are known parameters.
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